Post by RedFlag32 on Sept 3, 2007 9:15:41 GMT
The Independent - UK
September 3, 2007
The withdrawal of British forces from Basra Palace, ahead of an expected
full withdrawal from the city as early as next month, marks the beginning of
the end of one of the most futile campaigns ever fought by the British Army.
Ostensibly, the British will be handing over control of Basra to Iraqi
security forces. In reality, British soldiers control very little in Basra,
and the Iraqi security forces are largely run by the Shia militias.
The British failure is almost total after four years of effort and the death
of 168 personnel. "Basra's residents and militiamen view this not as an
orderly withdrawal but rather as an ignominious defeat," says a report by
the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. "Today, the city is
controlled by militias, seemingly more powerful and unconstrained than
before."
The British military presence has been very limited since April this year,
when Operation Sinbad, vaunted by the Ministry of Defence as a comparative
success, ended. In the last four months the escalating attacks on British
forces have shown the operation failed in its aim to curb the power of the
militias.
The pullout will be a jolt for the US because it undermines its claim that
it is at last making progress in establishing order in Iraq because Sunni
tribes have turned against al-Qa'ida and because of its employment of more
sophisticated tactics. In practice, the US controls very little of the nine
Shia provinces south of Baghdad.
The British Army was never likely to be successful in southern Iraq in terms
of establishing law and order under the control of the government in
Baghdad. Claims that the British military could draw on counter-insurgency
experience built up in Northern Ireland never made sense.
In Northern Ireland it had the support of the majority Protestant
population. In Basra and the other three provinces where it was in command
in southern Iraq the British forces had no reliable local allies.
The criticism of the lack of American preparation for the occupation by Sir
Mike Jackson, the former head of the British Army, and Maj Gen Tim Ross, the
most senior British officer in post-war planning, rather misses the point.
Most Iraqis were glad to get rid of Saddam Hussein, but the majority opposed
a post-war occupation. If the Americans and British had withdrawn
immediately in April 2003 then there would have been no guerrilla war.
The US has held most power while officially supporting the Iraqi government
because it did not want Saddam Hussein replaced by Shia religious parties
with close ties to Iran. Given that Shia are 60 per cent of the Iraqi
population this is probably inevitable.
Soon after the British arrival, on 24 June 2003, British troops learnt a
bloody lesson about the limits of their authority when six military
policemen were trapped in a police headquarters between Basra and al-Amara.
I visited the grim little building where they had died a day later. Armed
men were still milling around outside. A tribesman working for a leader who
was supposedly on the British side, said: "We are just waiting for our
religious leaders to issue a fatwa against the occupation and then we will
fight. If we give up our weapons how can we fight them?"
The British line was that there were "rogue" policemen and, once they were
eliminated, the Iraqi security forces would take command. In fact, the
political parties and their mafia-like militias always controlled the
institutions. When a young American reporter living in Basra bravely pointed
this out in a comment article he was promptly murdered by the police. One
militia leader was quoted as saying: "80 per cent of assassinations in 2006
were committed by individuals wearing police uniforms, carrying police guns
and using police cars."
Could any of this have been avoided? At an early stage, when the British had
a large measure of control, there was a plan to discipline the militias by
putting them in uniform. This idea of turning poachers into gamekeepers
simply corrupted the police.
The violence in Basra is not primarily against the occupation or over
sectarian differences (the small Sunni minority has largely been driven
out). The fighting has been and will be over local resources.
The fragile balance of power is dominated by three groups: Fadhila, which
controls the Oil Protection Force; the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, which
dominates the intelligence service and police commando units, and The Mehdi
Army, which runs much of the local police force, port authority and the
Facilities Protection Force. One Iraqi truck driver said he had to bribe
three different militia units stationed within a few kilometres of each
other in order to proceed.
In terms of establishing an orderly government in Basra and a decent life
for its people the British failure has been absolute.
news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2921877.ece
September 3, 2007
The withdrawal of British forces from Basra Palace, ahead of an expected
full withdrawal from the city as early as next month, marks the beginning of
the end of one of the most futile campaigns ever fought by the British Army.
Ostensibly, the British will be handing over control of Basra to Iraqi
security forces. In reality, British soldiers control very little in Basra,
and the Iraqi security forces are largely run by the Shia militias.
The British failure is almost total after four years of effort and the death
of 168 personnel. "Basra's residents and militiamen view this not as an
orderly withdrawal but rather as an ignominious defeat," says a report by
the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. "Today, the city is
controlled by militias, seemingly more powerful and unconstrained than
before."
The British military presence has been very limited since April this year,
when Operation Sinbad, vaunted by the Ministry of Defence as a comparative
success, ended. In the last four months the escalating attacks on British
forces have shown the operation failed in its aim to curb the power of the
militias.
The pullout will be a jolt for the US because it undermines its claim that
it is at last making progress in establishing order in Iraq because Sunni
tribes have turned against al-Qa'ida and because of its employment of more
sophisticated tactics. In practice, the US controls very little of the nine
Shia provinces south of Baghdad.
The British Army was never likely to be successful in southern Iraq in terms
of establishing law and order under the control of the government in
Baghdad. Claims that the British military could draw on counter-insurgency
experience built up in Northern Ireland never made sense.
In Northern Ireland it had the support of the majority Protestant
population. In Basra and the other three provinces where it was in command
in southern Iraq the British forces had no reliable local allies.
The criticism of the lack of American preparation for the occupation by Sir
Mike Jackson, the former head of the British Army, and Maj Gen Tim Ross, the
most senior British officer in post-war planning, rather misses the point.
Most Iraqis were glad to get rid of Saddam Hussein, but the majority opposed
a post-war occupation. If the Americans and British had withdrawn
immediately in April 2003 then there would have been no guerrilla war.
The US has held most power while officially supporting the Iraqi government
because it did not want Saddam Hussein replaced by Shia religious parties
with close ties to Iran. Given that Shia are 60 per cent of the Iraqi
population this is probably inevitable.
Soon after the British arrival, on 24 June 2003, British troops learnt a
bloody lesson about the limits of their authority when six military
policemen were trapped in a police headquarters between Basra and al-Amara.
I visited the grim little building where they had died a day later. Armed
men were still milling around outside. A tribesman working for a leader who
was supposedly on the British side, said: "We are just waiting for our
religious leaders to issue a fatwa against the occupation and then we will
fight. If we give up our weapons how can we fight them?"
The British line was that there were "rogue" policemen and, once they were
eliminated, the Iraqi security forces would take command. In fact, the
political parties and their mafia-like militias always controlled the
institutions. When a young American reporter living in Basra bravely pointed
this out in a comment article he was promptly murdered by the police. One
militia leader was quoted as saying: "80 per cent of assassinations in 2006
were committed by individuals wearing police uniforms, carrying police guns
and using police cars."
Could any of this have been avoided? At an early stage, when the British had
a large measure of control, there was a plan to discipline the militias by
putting them in uniform. This idea of turning poachers into gamekeepers
simply corrupted the police.
The violence in Basra is not primarily against the occupation or over
sectarian differences (the small Sunni minority has largely been driven
out). The fighting has been and will be over local resources.
The fragile balance of power is dominated by three groups: Fadhila, which
controls the Oil Protection Force; the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, which
dominates the intelligence service and police commando units, and The Mehdi
Army, which runs much of the local police force, port authority and the
Facilities Protection Force. One Iraqi truck driver said he had to bribe
three different militia units stationed within a few kilometres of each
other in order to proceed.
In terms of establishing an orderly government in Basra and a decent life
for its people the British failure has been absolute.
news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2921877.ece