Its not just complex, but difficult to put into practice.
Comrade, id be interesdted in hearing why you think it is very hard to put into practice. Not out of any disbelief but because i think we might be on the same wave lenght regarding the uses of an armed wing.
I think the conditions that political organisations who maintain a military capacity operate under in modern times make it extremely difficult to put into practice what is outlined in the Ta power document - from my outward view and
assumptions of the structures and conditions of these movements.
It is realy this which I am referring:
"1: Politics in command
2: Internal democracy
3: Absolute legitimacy
4: Collective Leadership
5: Central authority
6: Coherency
7: Accountability
8: Discipline
9: Efficiency
10: Effectiveness"As Ta outlined, a failure in one will have knock on effects on the rest.
7 and 8 I would think, due to conditions which necessitate significant autonomy for military structures, will, and I think have, created problems of accountability and discipline within not just the INLA, but other military organisations.
The organisations must be autonomous and power decentralised to avoid and counter modern methods of surveilence and the threat of informers, along with the development of greater autonomy when operating in urban conditions (particularly where there is no base of support) as opposed to rural forms of 'warfare'.
In small organisations such as the INLA, one informer in a well positioned place,
if the organisation were not decentralised and its 'appendages' not autonomous, could destroy the entire organisation - by knowing weapons dumps, members, actions, contacts and structures. So its members, or at least the overwhelming majority, would have very little information regarding the entire movement. And indeed the higher ranks, maybe leadership ot army council, would be limited also, say, in where weapons are located. (for if the higher ranks were swooped on if it were not the case, the entire organisation would cease and be done with). So Power and information are something decentralised, dispersed and limited to most I assume.
Within a small organisation, with decentralised power, "discipline" of a particular 'section' could mean a split, or a feud. This has political consequences. Within the IRSM, this has been the longest stretch of stability since its formation. Previous feuds wrecked it, demoralised its members and nearly destroyed the organistion. So at all costs, rocking the boat will be avoided in terms of disciplining certain areas of autonmous power.
The only contact those lower ranks of the organisation, I assume, have, is with their superior. Their information is extremely limited (to counter informers and maintain security). This creates a situation where the only 'information' is through their superior. Not only that, but their lack of contact with other parts of the organisation will create a certain bond and loyalty to their superior, and his direction and orders. Maybe im outling a sort of Active Service Unit structure here -
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_service_unitThe superior has significant authority and autonomy. He controls, in effect, his own 'gang'. He knows the location of his units weapons.
If for whatever reason, this "superior" becomes corrupted (as has happened countless times in history), any form of discipline and accountability will be extremely limited. He maintains his own loyal following who's political education may be questionable, who may have been recruited by their "superior", who's only, or at least the overwhelming portion of information comes from the superior. This unit has weapons, and would potentially, under the command of the superior, defend itself against disciplinary action.
And then there's accountability. Given the delicate nature of discipline - one wonders what the process of accountability is of the superior to the higher ranks of the organisation. Is it based entirely on trust? is it based on the superiors word? - I really dont know. But whatever way it is, I assume contact between 'superior' and higher ranks is extremely limited given the security conditions needed. There is no room for an interrogated and detailed look at the the ongoings of a certain, say, ASU. I think trust is probably key.
Within the IRSM alone, questions could be asked about the discipline and accountability when people within the INLA can establish factions and do pretty much as they wish. The O Hare incident is an example. From what i know, he was not part of the INLA at the time, but established his own faction. Where was the accountability? where was the discipline? was it ordered by the cental leadership? Then you have the splits with the IPLO, and then more with INLA GHQ. You also have various sectarian attacks which may or may not have been autonomous, or to do with the organisation. The CRF are said to be a front of the INLA - or members of it.
And this I think happened to all of the paramilitary organisations. Saor Eire dispanded because elements of it got corrupted. The drugs claims against RSF and RIRA may be true too. The Provo's are certainly involved in criminality. But with the provo's, being such a large movement, greater powers of discipline are possible from the central leadership. Attempts at discipline are less likely to cause a "split". Dissent or criminality could be crushed with the resources and manpower, as opposed to the likes of saor eire in which discipline would have been deadly to the organistion as a whole, being only small.
I think the nature of these organisations are not as sophisticated as it would seem, particularly the smaller ones. The conditions in which they need to operate are to blame.
There are lots of things why the Ta power doc is difficult to implement, not just these aspects.
But saying that, I still do believe a military capability is something useful for socialist organisations to have. Not in the belief that they can create a revolution, or fight an armed struggle - but for things more immediate and practical. Infact thats the role the OIRA took I think.
The solutions to these problems is probably the education of members. But its a drawn out process because those who have autonomous power now, are probably not educated or driven by socialism or even republicanism, and who probably assumed their position based upon, well I dont know.
But again, its all assumptions. But I think its logical enough, particularly if you look at what happened in the past and the conditions a subversive organistion must operate under in the present.
