Chávez's U-turn on socialismStephanie BlankenburgPublished 08 January 2008
www.newstatesman.com/200801080001Venezuela-based economic advisor and analyst, Stephanie Blankenburg,
on what could be Chávez's fight for survival
On 2 January, a month on from his defeat in a referendum about a
socialist reform of the county's constitution, President Hugo Chávez
Frías of Venezuela performed a stunning political U-turn.
In typically flamboyant style, he made a surprise call to Venezolana
de Televisión, the country's main state-owned TV channel, "to drop a
'bombita' (small bomb)" on an unsuspecting public: He had decided to
abandon his socialist agenda "for now" in order to form stronger
alliances with the country's middle classes, its private sector and
the national bourgeoisie instead.
To dispel any doubts about his seriousness in adopting this new
political course, he replaced vice-president, Dr Jorge Rodríguez – the
public face of his campaign for "21st century socialism" in Venezuela
– with Ramón Carrizales, a military officer and technocrat, known for
his good relationships with the country's business sector.
Perhaps more significantly still, Chávez had already signed an
end-of-the year amnesty for imprisoned perpetrators of a right-wing
coup attempt against him in 2002.
The President's version of events
Two days later, on his Sunday TV show "Aló Presidente" (Hallo,
President), Chávez presented his fully reshuffled new cabinet and set
out to explain the rationale for his action. His socialist project had
been defeated, because the country had not been ready for such a
radical approach.
The only democratic response was to acknowledge defeat and to adopt a
more gradual and inclusive way forward. Apart from broadening
alliances to bring private business and the middle classes back into
the fold, this would also mean a more careful focus on mass education
and communal self-organisation. Socialism had not been abandoned, but
postponed, although, by the sound of things, for quite some time to
come.
Chávez' analysis of the current situation certainly has the pleasant
ring of reasonableness to it. There also is little doubt, even amongst
the most fervent socialists in Venezuela, that the agenda for "21st
socialism", adopted in January 2007 as abruptly as it has now been
abandoned, had been rushed in with too much haste, limiting space and
time for public consultation and debate of often complex issues.
Yet, the solidity of this analysis stands and falls with the
correctness of its main premise – that the failure of voters to
approve the constitutional reform project in the referendum of 2
December was a vote against socialism. This is much less clear.
What is clear is that the defeat of Chávez' reform project at the
polls is down to the abstention of roughly three million voters, who
only a year earlier had voted for him as their president on the same
socialist platform.
Compared to the December 2006 presidential elections, the opposition
did not gain any votes. It seems unlikely such a substantial bloc of
Chávez supporters should have been deterred merely by deficient
campaigning a year after enthusiastically endorsing him.
In fact, a closer look at electoral patterns reveals a clear protest
vote, not against a socialist agenda, but against corrupt
administrations, at the national and the regional level.
Chavismo and the 'oil curse'
To understand, where this protest vote came from and why it outweighed
the pro-Chavez and pro-socialism vote, it helps to remember that
Venezuela is defined by only one thing – oil.
For almost a century, the state has been a gigantic machine to
distribute oil rent. In this context, left and right have a rather
different meaning from their usual connotations.
On one side of a profound societal divide, there are those who benefit
from oil from the very rich elites down to middle-rank state employees
with comfortable pension arrangements.
On the other side, there are those who are excluded from a share in
this bounty, the poor and the lower middle classes.
Not surprisingly, the main objective of the "insiders" is to defend
and expand their share in the country's oil wealth. Those on the
outside divide into the small group with some chance of eventually
making it to the inside, and the much larger group of people without
any realistic chance of ever getting there.
The latter are, or used to be, core Chávez supporters: Their only hope
is structural reform that dismantles the distributive rent state and
replaces it by a productive developmental state. Until now, they had
set their hopes on Chávez.
That these hopes have been rattled, is only marginally to do with a
hasty referendum campaign, or with the people's ideological
immaturity.
On the contrary, one of the most impressive achievements of Chavismo
is precisely the very high degree of political awareness and education
amongst the poor.
No, the vote outcome has everything to do with the accession of many a
Chavista to the rank of "insider" over the past eight years. This
process has been gradual, and perhaps inevitable in a society in which
institutionalised rentier-mechanisms have been endemic for decades.
But the contradiction between a radical socialist government agenda
and the "Chavista elite", bent on defending its share in the oil rent,
effectively came to a head last year.
Far from being a left-wing administration, the bulk of ministerial
positions in the old cabinet, as well as many governorships, remained
in the hands of the "Chavista right", or "new insiders".
For example, the new vice-president, Ramón Carrizales, is also
ex-minister of Housing, a core social policy ministry.
All through 2007, the battle between this "Chavista elite" and the
"Chavista street" was fought out within government, with the so-called
left-wingers, led by Jorge Rodríguez, in the minority.
It is an open secret in Venezuela that many governors, while publicly
campaigning for a 'yes' vote in the referendum, used their resources
to mobilise for the no-vote behind the scenes.
Equally an open secret is the sudden destabilisation of the economy
through food shortages and an escalating black market dollar exchange
rate which was at least allowed to linger on for longer than
necessary.
A 'soft coup' or a return to electoral glory?
So the Chávez U-turn looks a lot less radical. For one, the new
cabinet resembles its predecessor more than it differs from it. More
importantly, it is not at all obvious the strategy of a shift to the
"right" will help to pacify the country and stabilize the economy.
Why? Well if it is correct that the result of 2 December was
essentially a protest vote by the "Chavista street" against the
"Chavista elite", then giving the latter free range is unlikely to
boost Chávez with the popular base.
Yet, this popular base is all that stands between him and a 'soft
coup' by an emboldened middle class, made up of the "Chavista elite",
the largely a-political state bureaucracy and moderate such as
ex-General Raúl Baduel, a former ally and defence minister who joined
the opposition ranks in November 2007.
After all, with the control over the country's state apparatus and
economic resources firmly in the hands of these groups, and a weakened
popular base for Chávez, perhaps unable to deliver election future
victories, why would the middle classes and their allies in the new
and old elites still need Chávez?
Chávez is too much of a seasoned politician not to know this. If he
still has chosen this course, it is not necessarily because it is of
his liking or even of his making alone. It simply reflects the real
distribution of power on the ground. His most important response is
not the much publicized government reshuffle, but his decision to
accelerate the organisation of a Chavista mass party, the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).
The task of getting this new mass party up to speed is an uphill one,
especially with a "Chavista" government in place that has no interest
in promoting such a move, and the popular base alienated.
But unless Chávez – and the PSUV – win the regional and municipal
elections scheduled for November 2008, Venezuela might well have a new
president before the year is out.
In charge of the unenviable task to built a mass party in a few months
and to win elections by the end of the year is none other than Jorge
Rodríguez.
Dr Stephanie Blankenburg is Lecturer in International Political
Economy in the Economics Department at the School of Oriental and
Social Studies (SOAS), London. She is currently on secondment to
Venezuela as an economic advisor and analyst. This article reflects
her personal analysis and is unrelated to any government views or
policies.
